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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Howard, the Appellant, objects to Buhler's stating as a fact 
that Howard had settled his claim previously for $2,834.00 when 
the trial court expressly ruled otherwise (R293). 
Howard further objects to Buhler inserting argument among 
the "facts" ("Plaintiff wholly mistates Ms. Kirchoff's testimony 
at trial with respect to the $8,000 settlement") P.10 et sic. 
Howard further objects to the "facts" stated on P.12 as to 
what Howard said in regard to the $2,834.00 "settlement" when the 
trial court determined that no such settlement was made. There 
was no cross appeal in this case and reference to it could only 
be for the purpose of prejudicing the appeal as the $8,000 
"settlement". 
Howard further and most strenuously objects to Buhler citing 
as evidence to sustain the judgment in question an excerpt from a 
deposition when said excerpt was not admitted in evidence (P.12). 
Furthermore, because the question to which Howard responded was a 
hypothetical one and one that did not state all the facts and 
particularly the fact that Howard wanted to receive a written 
offer of $8,000 in order to reduce his attorney's fees if the 
offer was inadequate as compared to a probable jury verdict and 
the claim was sued upon. 
Howard objects to further argument commingled with "facts" 
on P.13. Furthermore, the argument implied that silence is an 
acceptance of the offer and that at a point in time prior to 
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Howard having an opportunity to consult with his counsel to 
ascertain whether more could be obtained by suit. That situation 
quite understandably caused him to testify truthfully at trial 
that he "might have settled for $8,000" (and would have if his 
attorney was unwilling to pursue the claim on a contingent 
percentage of recovery of the sum collected in excess of $8,000). 
Howard likewise objects to the argument in the guise of 
facts on page 14 when he asserts "a reasonable person would have 
understood that Plaintiff had settled his claim." Certainly a 
reasonable person who knew that Plaintiff had an attorney who 
would not charge any fee on the sum that Buhler's insurance 
carrier was willing to pay before suit was filed would not 
believe he had settled. The only comment Howard made regarding 
settlement was that he was ready to settle. He certainly did not 
say he was then willing to settle for $8,000. The fact that he 
did not disclose that he was going to consult a certain attorney 
who had already committed himself to an advantageous fee 
arrangement if in the attorney's opinion the offer was not a fair 
and reasonable one did not breach any duty owed to the adverse 
party. The parties were dealing at arm's length. To require 
such disclosure under penalty of converting such silence into 
acceptance is to arm insurance adjustors with a dangerous weapon 
indeed. The fact that the proposed fee arrangement in not the 
usual and customary one does not alter the principle in question, 
the principle being that the claimant must manifest his 
acceptance of an oral settlement offer in an unambiguous manner 
6 
that can not be misunderstood if an oral accord is to result 
therefrom. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Under No. 1 on page 14 Buhler still insists, as in his brief 
to the trial court that, "all credible evidence ** supports the 
trial court finding (of an accord).11 Immediately thereafter he 
characterizes as "unexpressed and improper" the motive that 
Howard had in obtaining an offer in writing of the insurance 
company to pay $8,000. The motive in question was clearly 
established by documentary evidence to wit exhibits 43 and 44 
both of which clearly attest to Howard's intention to not settle 
his case before consulting with counsel. No ipse dixit assertion 
to the contrary precludes such evidence as being credible. 
Under No. 2 Buhler characterizes the issues on appeal as 
"meritless." Howard respectfully submits that that does not make 
them so and begs the questions so raised. Buhler appears to 
argue that only cases of first impression warrant common law 
changes in the law. This is clearly erroneous. The doctrine of 
sovereign immunity has been either abolished or drastically 
restricted in most states. The law in many of those states were 
altered, by judicial decision rather than by legislation. The 
cases where sovereign immunity was abolished or modified by 
judicial decision were not grounded on the fact that they were 
cases of original impression. Quite the contrary, those courts 
had faced that same issue too many times in the past that they 
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could not do an injustice one more time. 
As to No. 3, to characterize this appeal as "frivolous" does 
not make it so. Buhler, under this summary, argues that Howard 
seeks to "retry the facts of the case" which a review of Howard's 
Appellant Brief and this one shows is not so. 
ARGUMENT I 
THIS APPEAL WAS FILED IN GOOD FAITH AS THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE 
THAT HOWARD ACCEPTED THE $8,000 OFFER ORALLY OR OTHERWISE. 
The parties are agreed that on appeal (at least on this 
point) the issue is "whether there was sufficient evidence for 
the trial court to so find" (P.16). 
Likewise, the parties are agreed that under the present law 
Buhler has only the burden of preponderance (this does not alter 
at all Howard's urging the higher standard of "clear and 
convincing") and that the trial court must be affirmed if "there 
is competent evidence to support the findings . . ." (P.17 
quoting from Search v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 649 P2d 48 
(Utah, 1982) . 
Howard respectfully submits that Buhler's only claim for 
such competent evidence is a self-serving conclusion of his 
insurance adjuster that she made in response to a question 
directed to what the adjustor's understanding was as to whether 
Howard's claim had been "concluded by both parties" and she 
responded: "I believe it was concluded. I offered, he accepted" 
(P.11). Since it is the conclusion of the trier of fact that 
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determines what the facts are rather than the conclusion of the 
witness, the witness should state only the facts so that the 
trier of fact can reach his, her or their own independent 
conclusions and not adopt the witnesses7 conclusion which may be 
erroneous. In this case the witness did both. When asked, "What 
was discussed during the conversation?" she quoted Howard as 
saying only, "I am ready" (P.11). Is a statement as to readiness 
to settle competent evidence of acceptance of a specific offer? 
To so argue is to urge acceptance of a non sequitor and 
particularly so in this case when the trier of fact knew that 
Howard did not intend to settle until he obtained his attorney's 
opinion as to whether $8,000 was a fair and reasonable settlement 
(in fact it wasn't fair or reasonable since Buhler offered 
$16,000 prior to trial - R116-118). 
On page 17 Buhler notes that Howard has made "no suggestion 
that the trial court abused its discretion. No such suggestion 
of that has been or will be made as Howard respectfully submits 
that no judge has discretionary power make a finding of fact 
which is not supported by competent evidence. Where, as here, 
there is no competent evidence of Howard accepting an $8,000 
offer, the trial court had no discretion to find that he had. 
Buhler contends that the term "agreed" in the Ex. 12 means 
Howard agreed to accept $8,000 in full settlement. It does not 
say that; however, it does say, "Please send me my release form 
on which we agreed" (underscoring added). Had he settled for 
$8,000 he would be asking for the $8,000 not for the form. This 
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sentence must not be read out of context if justice is to be 
done. It must also be emphasized that the trial court did not 
base its finding on this piece of evidence because the trial 
court found that the agreement was entered into on July 8 (the 
date of the phone conversation between Howard and the adjuster) 
not 31 days later when the adjuster received that note (R288, 
Finding No. 2). It is important to note that it was not until 
after the adjuster responded to this request to exchange 
documents (school contract for $8,000 release form) that Howard 
met with his counsel, learned that $8,000 was not a fair and 
reasonable settlement and signed the contingent fee contract to 
start the lawsuit (Ex. 44). 
Buhler next claims that Ex. 12, received August 8th 
"memoralized" the prior oral "settlement" of July 8th. The fact 
is that the two-sentence written communication in question really 
memorialize the prior oral agreement of July 8th to exchange 
documents so that the insurance adjuster had the computer school 
contract to justify her increasing her offer from $2,834 to 
$8,000 in exchange for a written release form so that Howard 
would receive $8,000 clear of any fee claim if his attorney 
elected to sue on his claim. As noted in Buhler's brief at page 
21 and 22, the evidence in this case as to Howard's acceptance is 
entirely oral with respect to the accord found by the court and 
hotly disputed, whereas in Allen v. Bissinger, 62 Utah 226, 219 
P539 (1923) the critical evidence was in writing and not 
substantially in conflict. 
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Howard has never claimed and does not claim now that an 
accord under present law must be in writing to be valid. Howard 
does claim that the existing standard of oral proof as a matter 
of good public policy is not adequate and a "clear and 
convincing" standard should be established by an advance in the 
common law of Utah where the subject matter of the accord is the 
settlement of an insurance claim. This argument logically should 
be reserved for Point II, but is inserted here to address 
Buhler's i (sic) on P.22. Thus, Howard has no quarrel with the 
decisions cited by Buhler in this section. This is not to say, 
however, that the unsigned release form as to both the $2,834 
settlement offer and the $8,000 are not relevant evidence in 
weighing whether or not there was an accord. In this case, 
however, on this point the issue is not whether the weight of 
Buhler's evidence was greater than that of Howard, but rather, as 
noted above, whether there is any competent evidence to sustain 
the finding of accord, i.e., can the court base a finding on an 
interested witness's conclusion when the facts on which that 
conclusion is based do not sustain it. 
No case on the precise issue of whether or not a witness's 
conclusion of law is evidence and, if it is, whether it is 
sufficient to sustain a finding challenged on appeal. The 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Presbytery of 
Beaver Butler v. Middlesex 489 A2d 1317 (Pa. 1985) said: 
"The standard of review for an appellate court in 
reviewing the findings of a court in equity is well 
established. Facts found by the chancellor, when 
supported by competent evidence in the record, are 
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binding. However, no such deference is mandated for 
conclusions of law and we are at liberty to review such 
conclusions." 
An earlier Pennsylvania case in 1976 expressed the principle 
thusly: 
"It is fundamental that this Court will not 
overturn a chancellor's factual conclusions if they are 
supported by competent evidence. Hatalowich v. 
Redevelopment Authority of City of Monessen454 Pa. 481, 
312 A.2d 22 (1973); Silver v. Silver, 421 Pa. 533, 219 
A.2d 659 (1966). This is especially the case where the 
credibility of the witnesses must be determined. 
Hankin v. Goodman, 432 Pa. 98, 246 A.2d 658 (1968). On 
the other hand, it is equally well established that the 
chancellor's conclusions, whether of law or fact, being 
no more than his reasoning from the underlying facts, 
are reviewable. Van Products Co. v. General 
Welding & Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 213 A.2d 769 
(1965); Hoffman v. Rittenhouse. 413 Pa. 587, 198 A.2d 
543 (1964)." 
The cases support Howard's claim and the instant case is an 
afortiori one since here the conclusion of law (that Howard had 
"accepted" the offer) was that of witness who had much at stake 
as to the outcome of the case whereas in the other cases the 
conclusion was that of the judge appealed from. 
ARGUMENT II 
A STANDARD OF "CLEAR AND CONVINCING" EVIDENCE SHOULD HERE IN 
AND HENCEFORTH BE ESTABLISHED TO PROVE AN ACCORD WHEN THE SUBJECT 
MATTER OF THE ACCORD IS THE SETTLEMENT OF AN INSURANCE CLAIM. 
The implication of Buhler's argument under this point is 
there can be no judicial changes of law by decisions which are 
not cases of original impression. This is not so in either 
principle or practice (as to details of latter see P.7,8 supra). 
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Even if this were true, however, Buhler has not cited any cases 
even remotely similar where the following elements were present 
(a) the insurance adjuster took a tape-recorded statement of the 
claimant's initial contact and statement of facts, but did not 
tape record a later conversation which she claims resulted in an 
oral acceptance of her offer even though the latter conversation 
was much more critical, nor did she offer any explanation for not 
doing so (b) between the two conversations referred to in (a) the 
insurance adjuster contended and testified in support thereof 
that the claimant had orally settled the same claim for about one 
third of the later offer, had sent to claimant the usual release 
form which was not returned and concerning which the adjuster 
made no effort to enforce the earlier claimed accord (c) about a 
month later the adjustor wrote a letter indicating that the 
claimant's options to settle or not were still open. 
Under the foregoing facts the application of a higher 
standard of proof in such a case would not be a decision with 
widespread applications, but would have the salutary result of 
requiring insurance adjusters to document exactly what was said 
to avoid the uncertainties and ambiguities which have plagued 
this case. On the contrary, an affirmation of the judgment on 
this accord will certainly be a "green light" for oral 
settlements and an awesome temptation to take advantage of an 
unwary claimant. 
As for Holder v. Holder. 340 P2d 761 (Utah, 1959) Howard 
stands by his claims for that case. If the standard of proof 
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necessary to overcome the presumption of legitimacy prior to 
Holder was proof beyond a reasonable doubt would not Buhler have 
cited such cases? In any event, each advance in the common law 
by judicial decision must be based on considerations of policy 
and Howard has not contended that the policy reasons for our 
Supreme Court advancing the common law in Holder are applicable 
to the policy consideration here involved which are obviously 
very different. 
ARGUMENT III 
THIS IS NOT A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL 
Howard respectfully submits that his appeal is not 
frivolous. Litigation necessarily costs money in dollars and in 
time. Many appeals are settled by compromises before decisions 
are rendered. In this point Buhler is requesting that this court 
speculate as to Howard's motives in prosecuting this appeal and 
to penalize him if they are found to be unworthy. To rule in 
favor of Buhler on this point would set a very dangerous 
precedent as a very high percentage of plaintiff appeals are for 
the same purpose as this one to obtain a judgment or a larger 
judgment where none or a smaller one was the result of the trial 
in the lower court. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment appealed from should be vacated and the matter 
remanded to the trial court to enter findings of facts and 
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conclusions of law as to liability and damages based on the 
evidence produced at the trial of this cause. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of October, 1989. 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Appellant 
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